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This article begins by describing the United Kingdom's
policy toward outward and inward direct investment and then sets out the
essentials of the competition laws that are among the major, nondiscrimina-
tory regulatory mechanisms that affect corporate behavior and planning.
The article also analyzes the development of competition policy as a micro-
economic instrument along with its application to monopoly, oligopoly, and
cartels involving transnational corporations. Competition policy, except for
cartels, is shown to be relatively benign toward mergers until recently, and
with respect to monopoly and oligopoly has sought remedies in regulation of
prices and behavior rather than through structural change. Recent propos-
als, including a new Competition Act, are described. The analysis will show
that although transnational corporations have been prominent in competi-
tion policy enforcement, substantial detriments arising from their transna-
tional nature have not yet been identified, despite the presence of adverse
effects on the public interest. Traditional fears associated with foreign in-
vestment in the United Kingdom do not, therefore, seem to be justified,
insofar as the abuse of market power is concerned. In practice, the United
Kingdom has relied principally on an effective tax system and competitive
markets to ensure an equitable distribution of the gains from foreign direct
investment, and there has been relatively little interference with inward
flows of capital.
This article does not enter into the complexities of defining a transna-
tional corporation. As its purpose is to report on the U.K. government regula-
tion of companies simultaneously controlling and operating wealth-producing
assets in more than one country, it concentrates on those businesses which
fall within the framework of regulation. This means outward and inward
direct investment, the greater part of which is still in the manufacturing
industry.
J. Denys Gribbin is a staff member, Monopolies & Mergers Commission, The United
Kingdom. The views expressed in this article are those of its author only.
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U.K. POLICY TOWARD FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Since the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century, outward and in-
ward direct investment have been important components of U.K. economic
activity, and after World War II they assumed even greater significance.
Outward investment has traditionally been greater than inward; by 1974 the
value of the former was £ 10,000 million, and the latter was £ 6,900 million.
However, the pattern of outward investment has changed in recent decades.
Before World War II and for some time thereafter the Commonwealth and
former colonies were the major recipients; now these have been replaced by
North America and Western Europe. The latter are also the most important
sources of inward flows, with the United States normally providing well over
50 percent. Inward investment was concentrated in manufacturing industry,
but there is now considerable entry into banking with U.S. banks acquiring a
major share. In 1971 the United Kingdom held 15 percent of the stock of
direct foreign investment in developed economies compared with the 52
percent for the United States. Given such a commitment it is not surprising
that U.K. regulatory policies toward national and transnational corporate con-
centration are liberal and nondiscriminatory.
Until November 1979 both forms of investment-inward and outward-
required permission from the Bank of England under the Exchange Control
Act of 1947.' The principal objectives were threefold: (1) to protect the U.K.
balance of payments, (2) to ensure that inward investment made an appropri-
ate contribution to the foreign exchange reserves relative to the degree of
acquired control, and (3) to ensure that the price of assets purchased re-
flected their fair market value. There were no cases of importance during this
period in which government authorities refused permission for inward invest-
ment. Since the U.K.'s balance of payments has been strengthened by sales
of North Sea oil the need to protect the exchange rate has diminished and
exchange control has ceased since November 1979. Part II of the 1975
Industry Act2 introduced an additional control on inward investment which
empowered the government to prohibit takeovers of important manufactur-
ing firms where these would be against the national interest. Also, for certain
takeovers consummated after 1975, the secretary of state could acquire the
assets, subject to safeguards, and vest them in the National Enterprise
Board. 3 This provision has not been used.
There is one notable exception to present policy which relates to the
North Sea oil reserves. Here, the government has imposed special rules on
exploration, trading, as well as a Petroleum Revenue Tax.4 These controls are
nondiscriminatory even though a major share of the exploration investment
is held by foreign controlled companies.
Successive U.K. governments have traditionally welcomed direct foreign
investment. The secretary of state of the former Labour administration issued
the most recent policy statement, which appears in the foreword to the 1976
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U.K. publication of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. In
welcoming the guidelines and the intergovernmental consultative machin-
ery, he stated:
The U.K. has a special interest in this package in view of its major
stake in international investment. Inward investment has made a sub-
stantial contribution to our economy notably in terms of increased pro-
ductive capacity and employment, and the Government continues to
welcome foreign investment which contributes to our future develop-
ment. Investment overseas by U.K. companies brings us a substantial
return and enables us to develop markets overseas for U.K. exports and
to secure supplies of raw materials. 
5
The present government has made no policy statement, but there is no
reason to believe it will change this position, particularly in view of the
relaxation of exchange control in November 1979.
SOME ECONOMIC EVIDENCE AND POLICY ISSUES
As a response to the growing debate about multinationals in the late 1960s,
the U.K. Board of Trade commissioned an independent study to examine
some of the major implications of direct foreign investment. This study was
published in 1973 under the title "The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment
on the United Kingdom."'6 It was not intended to form a basis for U.K. policy,
but provided valuable insights into some of the critical issues. The authors
identified three areas for examination:
1. the possibility that there is a loss of national control over the econ-
omy attributable to foreign investment,
2. the possibility that there may be a loss of national autonomy because
of the influence of the government of the foreign parent company;
and
3. the economic effects of foreign investment on the U.K. balance of
payments, technological development, industrial relations, and com-
petition, as well as locational effects within industrial regions.
The report found little evidence of detriment to national control and
autonomy, although some potential disadvantages accruing from foreign
ownership were identified.7 However, these problems were not likely to arise
unless the U.K. subsidiary was part of a multinational network based on the
international division of labor and subject to strong central control. Even
then the incidence of such arrangements was relatively rare. The conclusion
on economic effects was that on balance direct investment had brought
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material gains from increased investment, improved balance of payments,
access to technology, and, tentatively, increased competition. The report
found a tendency for foreign investment to locate itself in oligopolistic indus-
tries (their degree of concentration being higher), but the authors cautioned
that in the absence of foreign firms, competition might not be enhanced;
there were also several large national firms in the concentrated industries.
Indeed, foreign entry may be a strong deterrent to domestic firms wishing to
exploit market power. The authors also suggested that oligopoly did not nec-
essarily indicate an absence of competition and a concomitant failure of firms
to share real income gains in the form of lower product prices and higher
factor incomes.
8
The study's findings on the association between inward investment and
oligopoly highlighted the importance of market structure and its influence on
competition. Some have questioned the validity of these findings since the
data which was relied on came from the 1963 Census of Production, and
there have been substantial subsequent changes in the sources and amounts
of investment. A less rigorous but more recent analysis by this author con-
firms the earlier findings. Data from the 1971 Census of Production at the
three digit (SIC) level of aggregation show that for 104 industries the average
share of sales coming from foreign-owned firms was 15 percent; there was a
noticeable, but weak, positive relationship between the degree of concentra-
tion of sales and foreign ownership. Table 1 contains the sales concentration
data, grouped by foreign ownership and share held by the five largest firms.
However, these statistics understate the relationship. There are another 41
industries where the degree of ownership is not disclosed for reasons of
confidentiality. These industries are, on the average, more concentrated than
the 104, so it is highly likely that their inclusion would strengthen the statis-
tical result. Nevertheless, the relationship as found is not strong, and this
points to one conclusion: foreign ownership is unlikely to be a major cause of
high concentration in the U.K. manufacturing industry. There is also a policy
implication-there are several sufficiently concentrated industries with
above-average foreign ownership shares so as to cause legitimate concern
with the state of competition within these industries, and to question
whether foreign ownership in these circumstances results in forms of con-
duct and standards of performance which are against the U.K. public interest
yet not readily susceptible to national antitrust remedies. The remainder of
this article will examine these concerns.
THE COMPETITION LAWS AND THEIR APPLICATION TO CORPORATE
CONCENTRATION
United Kingdom competition policy has its origins in the wartime planning
for postwar full employment and trade liberalization. At home it was accepted
that the aims of competition policy were to promote industrial efficiency and
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Table 1.
Sales Concentration and Foreign Ownership in U.K.,
Three-Digit Manufacturing Industry, 1971
Foreign-
Owned Share Top Five Firms' Share of Sales'
(in percentage) 1-20% 21-40% 41-60% 61-80% 81-100% Total
0 5 5 2 6 3 21
1-20 9 17 17 5 6 54
21 40 - 6 8 4 3 21
41-60 - 1 2 1 1 5
61-80 - - 1 1 1 3
81-100 14 29 30 17 14 104
Source: Census of Production and Business Statistics Office.
a. In some industries this may be four or six.
help restrain price increases.9 As a result of U.S. wartime initiatives to pro-
mote trade liberalization in order to secure international full employment it
was agreed that safeguards should also be implemented to permit investiga-
tion and control of U.K. firms participating in national and international
export cartels.
Postwar policy can be conveniently divided into two periods, demarcated
on the basis of the predominant forms of industrial structure and behavior. In
the first, from 1948 to the early 1960s, the prewar and immediate postwar
inheritance of cartels was the primary policy target; in the second, which
followed and continues today, the concern is with the growth of industrial
and aggregate concentration.
The legislative landmarks of the earlier period are the Monopolies and
Restrictive Practices (Enquiry and Control) Act of 1948, l ° and the Restrictive
Trade Practices Act of 1956; 1" these provide, by contrast, a fair illustration of
the pragmatic nature of economic regulatory policy and its development.
However, as this policy was hardly concerned with dominant firms, and did
not examine issues which might have been raised by the transnational corpo-
rate activities, it will only be briefly described.
The 1948 Act was neutral toward industrial structure and behavior,
there being no presumption that cartels or high concentration were detri-
mental. Its purpose was, as stated in the title, to enquire into, and, if neces-
sary, control monopolies and restrictive corporate practices. This it did suc-
cessfully in the eight years prior to 1956.1" A Monopolies and Restrictive
Practices Commission (Commission) was established to investigate, upon
reference from the Board of Trade, situations where competition was re-
stricted, and to make public interest judgments pertaining to the structure,
behavior, and performance of the industries or firms concerned. The "public
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interest" test was very broad, but in practice the Commission interpreted it in
economic terms consistent with the purpose of achieving greater industrial
efficiency.' 3 As there was no legislative presumption against restrictions or
competition it was for the Commission to decide that the performance of a
cartel or dominant firm was better promoted by limiting competition rather
than encouraging it.
During the first eight years, the Commission investigated a representative
sample of eighteen cartels, two dominant firms, and examined a wide range of
practices coming within the general description of collective discrimination.
Although it found, in some special and limited circumstances, that certain
collective limitations on competition had encouraged technical efficiency and
rapid diffusion of new technology, its conclusions on cartels were overwhelm-
ingly unfavorable.' 4 Generally it found that cartels kept inefficient high cost
capacity in existence, froze industry structures, retarded innovation, and
caused costs and prices to be higher than they would be if there was greater
competition.15 The cumulative effect of this evidence, together with the Com-
mission's strong condemnation of collective restrictions such as exclusive
dealing, aggregated rebates, refusal to supply, and the collective enforcement
and maintenance of prices (resale price maintenance), was to swing public
opinion to the view that cartels should be prohibited on the presumption that
they caused substantial detriment to the economy.
Before discussing the implementation of these conclusions in the 1956
Restrictive Trade Practices Act16 it is useful to note three facets of the 1948
Act which have been of long term significance. The first is the robustness of
the public interest criteria; 17 these were adequate to deal with the conse-
quences of cartels, dominant firms, and mergers until 1973. By 1973 experi-
ence suggested that these criteria should relate more precisely to the newer
policy goal of controlling concentration. Second, the wording of the sections
dealing with collective behavior had been sufficiently flexible to bring both
implicit and explicit collusion with their reach.' 8 Third, and most important
for this article, the 1948 Act established the limit of U.K. jurisdiction, which
has remained unchanged. References by the Board of Trade to the Monopo-
lies Commission could only be made where goods were supplied in the
United Kingdom, or when the manufacturing process under investigation
was performed within the United Kingdom. Moreover, application of the
order-making power extended only to British subjects, corporate bodies in-
corporated in the United Kingdom, or persons carrying on business there;
however, the power also extended to acts performed outside the United King-
dom by those entities listed above.
The second policy stage relevant to cartels was implemented through the
Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956. " Henceforth collective restrictions
on competition were presumed to be against the public interest; firms wish-
ing to continue to participate in or to form cartels were required to disclose
full details to a new enforcement agency, the Office of the Registrar of
Restrictive Trading Arrangements, which then placed them in a public regis-
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ter. If the restrictions were not abandoned or modified, the registrar brought
the infringing cartel before the newly created Restrictive Practices Court for
a condemnatory judgment and prohibition on continuance. To rebut the
presumption the participants could plead specified benefits, but few suc-
ceeded in doing so.
20
The registration requirement revealed for the first time the extent to
which the manufacturing industry and its distributors were subject to private
collective regulation. By the end of 1963, 2,430 agreements were on the
register, over 80 percent of those that were eventually disclosed. It is esti-
mated that about 50 percent of manufacturing output was regulated in this
way.
2 1
Through a combination of public disclosure, determined action by the
registrar, and Restrictive Practices Court decisions, the 1956 Act had a dra-
matic effect. Only eleven agreements received the approval of the court, the
remainder being abandoned by the parties or modified to eliminate their
restrictive effects. As a consequence of this vigorous policy there has been
little effort by industry since the early 1960s to form legal cartels;22 although
new agreements are registered, they deal only with minor matters and are
judged to have no significant effects on competition. British cartel legislation
has been extremely effective in abolishing them and has thereby contributed
substantially to improved industrial efficiency.2
THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE CONCENTRATION
The second period of U.K. competition policy begins in the late 1950s, natur-
ally enough, after the successful and speedy abolition of cartels, and ad-
dresses the structural problems of concentration which arose out of postwar
growth and trade liberalization. During this second period, the adaptability of
earlier legislation was explored. Subsequently, the earlier statutes were re-
fined and strengthened with the infusion of merger control and greater
powers to deal with existing monopoly and oligopoly.
24
Notwithstanding the earlier extensive cartelization of the manufacturing
industry, structural change in the form of increasing concentration occurred
in the U.K. economy. There are several reasons for this trend toward in-
creased concentration. Technical change in many industries led to new op-
portunities for scale economies; economic growth at home and abroad
created larger markets; developments in communications and innovations in
management techniques made it easier for multiplant firms to be controlled
efficiently; and successive government administrations promoted mergers in
some industries as a means of achieving greater industrial efficiency. By the
late 1950s, therefore, it was possible to see increasing concentration, and an
important vehicle for this was merger.25 Interestingly, the success in abolish-
ing cartels added fuel to the developing merger boom.
The evidence on growing concentration has recently been reviewed in
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Table 2.
Share of the One Hundred Largest Enterprises in U.K.-
Manufacturing Net Output 1909-72
1909 1924 1935 1940 1953 1958 1963 1968 1970 1972'
Share
(in percentage) 16 22 24 22 27 32 37 41 39 41
Sources: S. J. PRAIS, THE EVOLUTION OF GIANT FIRMS IN BRITAIN (1976); DE-
PARTMENT OF PRICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION, A REVIEW OF MONOPOLIES AND
MERGERS, Green Paper, Cmnd. No. 7198 (1978).
a. A change in statistics slightly reduces comparability with earlier years.
a consultative document (Green Paper) of the previous government, A
Review of Monopolies and Mergers Policy.26 This review indicated that
both aggregate concentration and market concentration had grown more
rapidly in the United Kingdom than in the United States and other Euro-
pean economies, so that by the 1970s levels of concentration were sub-
stantially higher.2 7 Before describing the legislative response to this struc-
tural change it will be useful to set out some of the data which illustrate
the growth of concentration.
Aggregate concentration in the United Kingdom is usually indicated by
the share of net output or employment held by the 100 largest enterprises in
the private manufacturing industry; these indicia provide the most conve-
nient measure for the twentieth century. As they also reflect the growth of
market concentration they are a useful index of change.
Table 2 illustrates the growth of aggregate concentration in the twenti-
eth century. The conclusion from this series is that the U.K. post-World War
II rate of growth has been double that of the prewar period, although the
U.S. pre- and postwar growth rates are approximately the same.
Growing market concentration can be shown through a further analysis
of the relative importance of the 100 largest firms in the major industry
groups (table 3). The 100 largest enterprises increased their share of manu-
facturing output by 9 percentage points over the fourteen years, even though
in two major industries, metal manufacture and vehicles, it fell. This can
only be regarded as a significant change in industrial structure.
The rise in concentration must be seen in the context of greater compe-
tition from imports; for example, in 1955 imports were 4.5 percent of home
sales of manufactured goods whereas by 1977 they had grown to 15.9
percent. 28 To the extent that the imports are not made by the largest firms in
each industry this rising import share may reduce the market power conse-
quences of a higher concentration of U.K. production.
Mergers have played a major role in the growth of concentration. British
statistics provide a reasonably accurate description of the prolonged merger
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Table 3.
Estimated Share of the One Hundred Largest Enterprises by Industrial Order
(percentage of employment)
Industrial order 1958 1972
Food, drink, and tobacco 28 53
Chemicals and allied industries 34 42
Metal manufactures 55 22
Engineering and electrical goods 32 37
Shipbuilding and marine engineering 18 28
Vehicles 69 61
Metal goods 4 19
Textiles 9 29
Leather, leather goods, and fur - 9
Clothing and footwear 6 9
Bricks, pottery, glass, cement, etc. 11 28
Timber and furniture - 5
Paper, printing, and publishing 16 29
Other manufacturing 24 29
Total manufacturing 27 36
Source: DEPARTMENT OF PRICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION, A REVIEW OF MONO-
POLIES AND MERGERS, Green Paper, Cmnd. No. 7198 (1978), annex A.
Table 4.
Mergers between Industrial and Commercial Companies 1954-78
Companies Acquired Average Amount






Source: Business Monitor M7.
a. Data after 1968 are on a slightly different basis, but this does not distort the picture
shown here.
boom which began in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Table 4 gives relevant
data for five year periods from 1954 to 1978. The long and upward swing in
activity is readily apparent. Peak years were 1972 and 1973 when there were
1,210 and 1,205 mergers respectively. An earlier peak was 1965 with 1,000
mergers. (These coincide with peaks in economic activity and share values
on the Stock Exchange). The steadily rising trend in the average value of
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Table 5.
Inward Investment Mergers 1969-78
Companies Acquired Average Amount Share of All Mergers
Period (annual average) Paid £m Number Value
1969-73 19 2.6 2.0 3.6
1974-78 11 8.1 2.4 13.4
Source: Business Monitor M7.
Note: This table does not include acquisitions by foreign-owned companies already
operating in the United Kingdom.
acquired firms is also noted; some part is, of course, due to the inflation of
asset values.
Most mergers result in the disappearance of relatively small firms; be-
tween 1962 and 1969 only 3 percent of acquired companies were valued at
over £ 5m. While the pattern changed in the 1970s, large company acquisi-
tions still only represented 7 percent of the total number of acquisitions, but
62 percent of the assets acquired.
Reliable data on inward investment mergers has only been available
since 1969.29 Table 5 shows the flow and some relevant comparisons. The
flow of inward mergers indicates a similar pattern of decline in the 1974-78
period, although the fall is less pronounced possibly because the number of
mergers made by firms in the EEC doubled between the periods which, in
turn, substantially reduced the importance of U.S. firm activity. These
mergers differ in one major respect from U.K. activity-on the average they
are substantially larger in terms of the assets acquired.
Table 6 gives some perspective to the data on the postwar merger boom
and shows how it has contributed to the growth of concentration.
THE POLICY ISSUES OF CONCENTRATION
The immediately preceding section has examined the evidence on the
growth of concentration in the United Kingdom. Concern over this develop-
ment led in 1978 to a further review of the competition laws by an official
committee composed of civil servants, known as the Leisner Committee. Its
report was published as the Green Paper,30 which in paragraph 3.40 suc-
cinctly stated the relevant policy concerns:
It was noted in paragraphs 3.20 to 3.23 that increased concentra-
tion could be detrimental to consumers. This might arise from the
emergence of a single dominant firm which exerted its market power to
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Table 6.
Estimates of the Contribution of Mergers to the Growth of Concentration
Hart, Utton Aaronovitch Hannah
& Walshe Utton & Sawyer & Kay Prais
Study (1973) (1971) (1975) (1977) (1976)
Time





to mergers 33% 43% 62% 116%a  50%
95
Source: DEPARTMENT OF PRICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION, A REVIEW OF MONO-
POLIES AND MERGERS, Green Paper, Cmnd. No. 7198 (1978).
a I.e., concentration would have fallen in the absence of mergers.
obtain monopoly profits. Much more common, given the structure of
British industry, is the situation where several large firms dominate a
market. Under oligopoly it is possible for firms to forego price competi-
tion in favour of competition in other areas. Companies tend to be con-
scious of the interdependence of their activities and this may lead to
collusion in formulating decisions making them less responsive to the
needs of consumers. The various forms of non-price competition in-
volve, to a greater or lesser extent, resource costs and these in turn can
mean higher prices to the consumer. The creation and defence of a
position of market dominance can also involve resource costs which do
not necessarily yield a social gain. Thus the accretion of market power
through greater concentration can result in a range of practices which
are unique to markets characterised by dominant firms and which are
potentially against the public interest.
THE LEGISLATION ON CORPORATE CONCENTRATION
The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act of 1948
Although used primarily to explore the economic consequence of cartels, the
Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act of 194831 was also designed to test
monopoly and oligopoly against the same public interest criteria. The 1948 Act
permitted the Board of Trade to make references to the Monopolies Commis-
sion either where one firm held a one-third share of the market for goods (or
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process of manufacture), or where two or more firms met the same share test
and acted jointly to restrict competition, whether or not they formally agreed to
do so.32 Between 1948 and 1956 only two references of dominant firms were
made-those of matches and matchmaking machinery33 and industrial and
medical gases 4 -so the 1948 Act was little used against large firms in concen-
trated industries.
In the period following the 1956 Restrictive 'Practices Act the Monopo-
lies Commission explored some of the consequences of growing concentra-
tion, although the policy response to it was slow, there being only an aver-
age of 1.3 references a year between 1956 and 1966. The investigations
began to examine the causes and consequences of significant market
power, and thereby laid a foundation for future work, as well as drawing
attention to the consequences for the public interest when such power was
exercised. Practices found to be against the public interest included agree-
ments with foreign suppliers that eliminated competition in the United
Kingdom, open and concealed acquisitions of competitors, price discrimina-
tion, resale price maintenance, and exclusive dealing with full-line forcing.
3 5
Two industries included foreign-owned companies of substantial size, sub-
sidiaries of large multinationals; however, the investigations did not link any
adverse impact from market power solely to the multinational nature of the
enterprises involved. Although the references were few in number, the in-
dustries investigated were large and important and the impact of the find-
ings was greater than might be thought;36 these findings contributed to the
next stage of policy development-a legislative response to the rising wave
of mergers.
The Monopolies and Mergers Act of 1965
Public debate about merger control began in the early 1960s, fueled in part
by a number of spectacular and hard-fought takeover battles. In 1964 the
Conservative government issued a White Paper37 containing proposals for
strengthening the competition legislation. Among other things it proposed
the introduction of merger control. The White Paper welcomed the growing
merger wave because of the potential economic gains-better use of re-
sources, economies of scale, increased research and development, and
greater strength for competing in international trade. Only a small minority
of mergers were thought potentially detrimental, and therefore appropriate
targets for a regulatory scheme tailored to deal only with them. Thus, the
White Paper recommended a highly discriminating regulatory system that
applied to few mergers and avoided.a per se prohibition. This philosophy was
to shape policy and its implementation until more serious scrutiny of the
potential gains from concentration occurred in the 1970s.
The 1965 Act38 substantially strengthened the competition laws. Ser-
vices became subject to investigation by the Monopolies Commission;
merger control was instituted, with an automatic reference of certain pend-
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ing newspaper mergers; the Monopolies Commission was increased in size to
cope with a greater workload; and the order-making powers of the Board of
Trade were extended to prices, price discrimination, display of prices, and
most importantly, prohibition of mergers, dissolution, and conditions on busi-
ness activity where a merger could not be dissolved. Moreover, the power to
dissolve applied to any monopoly the Commission found to be against the
public interest.
39
For the purpose of this paper the most important innovation of the 1965
Act was the power conferred on the Board of Trade to make references of
actual or proposed mergers to the Monopolies Commission for a judgment on
their public interest consequences. This was the first attempt at a clear
antitrust remedy for mergers and the regulation of concentration which
arises through merger. The underlying philosophy was that each merger
should be treated on its merits, there being no general presumption that an
increase in concentration would decrease competition, or that even if concen-
tration did lessen competition that this was necessarily detrimental. 40 As this
was the same approach as to monopoly and oligopoly, the public interest
criteria were not altered; mergers had to face the same test.
In keeping with the 1964 White Paper view that only a small proportion
of mergers merited further scrutiny, the 1965 Act laid down two criteria
which narrowed the scope of governmental concern. To be within the scope
of control, a merger either had to create or intensify a monopoly as defined in
the 1948 Act,4' or the gross assets to be acquired had to be £5 million or
more. Merger is not precisely defined; it may occur when two enterprises
cease to be distinct, or where one enterprise has the ability to control or
materially influence the policy of another. 42 Therefore, merger was not defini-
tionally limited to a rigid concept of corporate restructuring or actual asset
acquisition; the term could be extended to activities that did not involve a
formal mixing of corporate assets or identities.
The 1948 Act did not impose upon enterprises a requirement to notify
the Board of Trade of an intended merger; however, government action had
to be initiated within six months after a merger became publicly known.43 In
practice, governmental control soon resulted in de facto prenotification be-
cause there was a risk that the merger might be dissolved after it had taken
place. To assist in reaching decisions the Board of Trade set up an interde-
partmental Mergers Panel which processed the relevant information and
made recommendations to the president of the Board of Trade who alone had
power to refer to the Monopolies Commission.
Upon receipt of a merger reference, the Commission must reach a con-
clusion within six months, but the minister can grant a three-month exten-
sion. If the Commission decides that a merger would be against the public
interest, it may propose a remedy or recommend prohibition or dissolution.
The minister may decline to act on such recommendations. However, if the
Commission does not initially find against a particular merger, the minister
has no independent power of prohibition or dissolution.
44
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The Fair Trading Act of 1973
Like its predecessors, the 1973 Act4 5 made major innovations in competition
policy that, building upon the accumulated experience of earlier enforce-
ment, strengthened the regulatory mechanism and emphasized the promo-
tion of competition. In particular, the legal and organizational changes have
created a more effective means of controlling corporate concentration.
The 1973 Act derives directly from the experience of using earlier legis-
lation to deal with issues raised by the growth of concentration. The deeper
analysis of structural change that had come from the Commission's investi-
gations suggested that in the presence of generally higher industrial concen-
tration in the 1970s, the emphasis of regulatory policy should be placed more
on oligopoly and its consequences. Moreover, the long-term implementation
of policy had illustrated that, except for the continuing political sensitiveness
of some mergers, monopoly, oligopoly, and restrictive practices did not raise
issues which needed to be settled by ministers. Accordingly, policy imple-
mentation could be removed from direct ministerial control and placed with
an independent body, a view reinforced by the need for an expanded program
of enforcement to grapple with oligopoly.
The new legislation expressed these conclusions by reducing the market
share definition of monopoly from 33 to 25 percent, and by creating the
Office of Fair Trading (OFT), which was responsible only to Parliament.
4 6
The director general of the OFT was given the power to make his own
monopoly and oligopoly references to the Monopolies Commission, subject to
a ministerial veto publicly exercised. This veto provision indicates that the
power to refer remained under political control, thus reflecting the continu-
ing view that mergers may raise social and political problems not usually
associated with settled monopoly.
The 1973 Act instituted another important change. Since the Monopolies
Commission had found restrictive service agreements to be similar in effect to
those for goods, the same procedures were applied to both. Agreements were
presumed to be against the public-interest and had to be registered.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY REGARDING CORPORATE
CONCENTRATION
The authoritative source of information on the public interest conse-
quences of concentration are the reports of the Monopolies Commission.
Table 7 sets out a brief description of the workload. Of particular impor-
tance are the reports on monopoly and oligopoly in the supply of goods,
and those on mergers, except newspapers.47 The general references re-
ported on refusal to supply, parallel pricing, recommended prices, and
professional services.
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Table 7.
Investigations by the Monopolies Commission, 1957-September 1979'
Investigation Number
Supply of goods 39






Source: J.D. GRIBBIN, THE POSTWAR REVIVAL OF COMPETITION AS INDUSTRIAL POLICY
(Government Economic Service Working Paper No. 19, 1978).
a. Excludes a follow-up study on imported timber.
THE INVESTIGATIONS INTO MONOPOLY AND OLIGOPOLY
These references demonstrate the growing concern of policy with oligopoly.
Of thirty-nine references only fourteen were of single-firm monopoly, and the
emphasis on oligopoly in recent years is becoming more pronounced. The
Commission's findings on the public interest consequences of monopolies
and oligopolies have created a substantial body of evidence about behavior
and performance in concentrated industries. Under the legislation, the Com-
mission may find either structure, behavior, or performance to be against the
public interest; it has rarely made such decisions about structure, there
being only four cases in which it concluded that the monopoly or oligopoly
itself was detrimental. Table 8 summarizes the relevant findings. The prac-
tices have been divided into the two groups. Those in the second are more
likely to be unequivocably judged detrimental when associated with oligopoly
or monopoly since they directly restrict competition by erecting artificial en-
try barriers. The practices in the first group are less easily assessed and the
evidence suggests that their consequences must be examined on a case-by-
case basis in the context of particular markets. For example, numerous in-
stances of technical price discrimination were examined, but the Commis-
sion concluded they had no significant effect on competition. The same point
may also be made about recommended prices.
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE MONOPOLY REFERENCES
Transnational corporations are prominent in the thirty-nine industries which
have been investigated for monopoly or oligopoly conditions. This is not sur-
prising, there being in the United Kingdom a strong correlation between
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Table 8.





Monopoly pricing/monopoly profit 9
Discriminatory pricing 8
Vertical integration 3
Acquisition of competitors 2
Recommended or imposed resale prices 6
Patent-licensing policy I
Delivered-pricing system 2
Financial interest in competitors 1
Failure to disclose ownership of subsidiary I
Group 2
Restriction of supply to certain outlets 3
Restrictions on sale of competitors' goods 13





Source: DEPARTMENT OF PRICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION, A REVIEW OF MONOP-
OLIES AND MERGERS, Green Paper, Cmnd. No. 7198 (1978). Updated by author.
company size, the market structure in which it operates, and, the extent to
which the company engages in foreign trade and investment.4 8 For the pur-
pose of this article transnational corporations have been divided into those
that are owned and have their main base in the United Kingdom (national
companies that have expanded abroad), and foreign-owned companies that
entered U.K. markets either by direct investment or acquisition. Over 90
percent of the U.K.-owned companies which were among the leading sup-
pliers considered in the thirty-nine references were transnational in that they
had one or more subsidiaries abroad. However, because of limited U.K. juris-
diction, these references were limited to imports into or exports from the
United Kingdom; hence, the Commission was precluded from examining the
actual overseas operations of these transnational corporations. These reports
do not indicate that the transnational links have reinforced the market power
of the U.K. parent.
4 9
The incidence of foreign-owned companies among the leading suppliers
in the thirty-nine references is shown in Table 9.
Before discussing the implications for competition in the United King-
dom it is worth noting that the reports which cover these twenty references
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Table 9.
Foreign-Owned Companies in Monopoly References, 1957-79
Country of Adverse
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Table 9-Continued
Country of Adverse
Report Company Parent Finding
17. Ceramic sanitary-
ware. 1978 Doulton, France No
Ideal Standard U.S. No
18. Wholesale supply Esso, Texaco, U.S. No
of petrol. 1979 Mobil, Conoco, U.S. No








20. Electric meters. Landis and Gyr, Switzerland No
1979 Sangamo Weston U.S./Netherlands No
Antilles
provide insight into the motivation for, and economic consequences of, direct
foreign investment. They also lend empirical support to the industrial organ-
ization theories which stress the importance of the foreign firm's competitive
advantage derived from product differentiation, new processes, and research
and development.
Typically, new foreign investment followed a period of market explora-
tion through exports.50 In general, the investments involved new plant con-
struction rather than acquisitions. A large proportion of these new firms were
established in the United Kingdom during the interwar period, with some
originating in the first decade of the twentieth century.5 1
This process has not stopped as entry continues to exploit new market
opportunities.5 2 Recent decades reveal a greater tendency to enter by ac-
quiring a U.K. company already in the market, as for example the acquisi-
tions of Findus (frozen food) by Nestl6,53 and those of GAF and Addresso-
graph Multigraph in the diazo market.54 A number of these foreign-owned
firms have subsequently developed into substantial transnational corpora-
tions in their own right, mainly because entry to the United Kingdom was
often regarded as a method of avoiding tariff barriers protecting former
Commonwealth markets and the European Economic Community. Prime
examples of this development are British United Shoe Machinery, Kodak,
and Rank Xerox.
55
In addition to illustrating the process of foreign entry into U.K. markets,
these twenty reports also provide a valuable framework for examining the
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impact of transnational corporate entry on competition in the United King-
dom. This relatively high incidence of foreign ownership in concentrated
industries raises three questions:
1. Do the links with the parent contribute to market power in the United
Kingdom?
2. If so, has that market power been used against the public interest?
3. Are existing U.K. antitrust remedies sufficient to regulate the market
power of such foreign-owned companies, and what problems do they
bring in enforcement?
The information in table 9 lists the foreign-owned companies which are
among the leading suppliers. In some cases these did not possess either 33
percent or, later, 25 percent of the market share; therefore, unless they
formed part of a complex monopoly (oligopoly) the Commission could not
make public interest judgments against them. However, these enterprises
were examined since they were leading suppliers.
The relevant cases are Nabisco, 56 Findus, 57 and GAF and Address-
ograph.18 In the diazo market, the Commission discovered a restrictive agree-
ment. Both GAF and Addressograph Multigraph acquired U.K. companies in
1966; the dominant supplier was U.K.-owned and played an important part
in organizing the collusion which began before the U.S. entry. A restrictive
agreement also was discovered in the aluminium semimanufacture market,
but the investigation was abandoned since the agreement was subject to the
restrictive practices legislation.
Apart from these references, foreign-owned companies were substantial
suppliers in eleven of the references in which the Monopolies Commission
made adverse public interest findings. These may be divided into three
groups: those in which the company was the dominant supplier (Champion,
Kodak, Kellogg's, Roche Products, BUSM, and Rank Xerox); those in which
the company was either dominant in a subsector of the market, or where a
duopoly existed (Potash Ltd. and Mallory Ltd. operated in subsectors, while
Proctor and Gamble was a duopolist); and those in which the company par-
ticipated in an oligopoly (the oil companies and Philips). 9
The fact that in eleven references there were adverse findings where
foreign-owned companies were involved would not, in and of itself, prove the
hypotheses that foreign ownership caused or contributed to the detriment.
However, the references do provide some evidence that may be used to
determine to what extent the parent-subsidiary linkage contributed to the
dominant position and behavior of the company in the United Kingdom.
Some background information is necessary for validating any conclu-
sions on the effects of foreign linkages on U.K. market structure. First, in
none of the references did the Commission find the dominant position itself
was against the public interest, so even in those instances where strong links
were important, foreign ownership per se could not be considered detri-
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mental.60 Second, as the adverse findings were about behavior, these must be
viewed in the context of the structure and history of each market. In the
oligopolistic petrol retail market, such activities as exclusive dealing, tie-in
arrangements, and preemptive purchase rights to premises, were judged to
be against the public interest, but these forms of behavior were not imported;
rather, they were practiced by the U.K. suppliers-Shell Mex and BP-and
were common in other industries where there were strong forward vertical
links into distribution. In the electric lamp market, Philips was the second
largest supplier among five. 6 1 Philips entered the United Kingdom shortly
after World War I, and conformed to established patterns of restrictive behav-
ior. Mallory had a large share in a small but growing sector, but it was
subject to some influence from the overall dominant supplier EverReady
(ER), (U.K.-owned) both because of ER's share, over 70 percent, and its 25
percent holding of Mallory's equity.
There is evidence that foreign entry can have beneficial effects upon the
competitiveness of market structure. Proctor and Gamble had entered the
U.K. market in 1930 by acquisition of a failing company, and effectively
transformed an almost complete monopoly held by Unilever into a duopoly.
Although the Commission considered whether Proctor and Gamble and Uni-
lever were using adverse advertising and pricing policies, the Commission
did not find that these detriments resulted from the control exercised by the
U.S. parent.62
The conclusion suggested by this group of investigations is that where
the market is shared with a U.K. firm, either by oligopoly or segmentation,
the links with the parent apparently do not strongly influence behavior. Of
more importance seems to be the relative position of the foreign-owned firm
vis-t-vis its U.K. competitors, and the length of time the foreign-owned firm
has been present in the United Kingdom. In all these cases the firms had
been trading for so long that they ceased to be regarded as foreign and
conformed substantially to patterns of behavior established by wholly owned
U.K. firms.
Links with foreign parents appear more important in those investigations
where the foreign-owned firm was dominant. Table 10 summarizes relevant
data about five such investigations, and indicates what appear to be the
critical links with the parent that contribute to the subsidiary's dominant
position in the United Kingdom.
63
It should be noted that except for the joint venture between Rank and
Xerox, the foreign investments are longstanding; this had a considerable influ-
ence on the Commission's views as to whether the subsidiary's market domi-
nance could be linked with the parent. In the cases of Champion, Kodak, and
BUSM, the Commission found that their initial impact on the market stemmed
from the parents' economic advantages, but that these were not crucial for
long term success. 64 The U.K. subsidiary of Champion was able to establish
itself in the market in part because of the parent's trading relationship with
Ford, which also had a subsidiary in the United Kingdom. However, the Com-
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Table 10.
Monopolies Commission Reports on Foreign-owned Dominant Firms
Market
Entered Share
Company U.K. Percentage Adverse Findings Links with Parent




a) assisted entry through
sales to U.S. subsidiaries
of parent's customers
in U.S.;






d) close consultation on
major policies


















1899 44 a) cancellation
(1971) charges




c) access to group R&D;
d) close control of parent.
a) on capital expenditures,
appointment of directors,
acquisitions disposals;
b) free access to R&D,
patents of parent;








Company U.K. Percentage Adverse Findings Links with Parent
Rank/Xerox 1956 89 a) restrictive a) patents;
(joint venture) (1975) patent
licensing; b) voting control exercised
by Xerox;
b) rental-only
policy; c) profit-sharing agreement;
c) group-pricing d) Xerox controls long-range
plan; plans, major policies,
pricing, sales, patents,
d) tie-in of trademarks;
toner
e) RX is principal exporter
for group.
Source: The Monopolies and Merger Commission.
mission decided that Champion's market dominance was attributable to price
discrimination between original and replacement equipment-a common fea-
ture it noted in the automobile parts industry of several countries.6 5 In addi-
tion, World War II had strengthened Champion's market position since a
number of competitors seriously weakened by the war effort were unable
subsequently to reestablish themselves.
As for Kodak, the Commission stated:
We think the bulk of the color film trade in this country was likely, for
economic reasons, to fall into the hands of not more than two or three
suppliers in any event; that the emergence of Kodak as the leading sup-
plier is due primarily to the strength of its already established position in
the photographic industry which was reinforced in the years during and
after the war, to the support of its American parent and to the technical
and commercial skills with which it has exploited these advantages; but
that it has attained a high [sic] degree of dominance in the color film
market than might have been the case if stronger British-based competi-
tion had been forthcoming and if other suppliers whose products are
subject to import duty had been able to compete on equal terms. 66
One of the important advantages of the link with the parent was access to
patents and R&D, but the Commission concluded that Kodak had not abused
its strength in these areas. Thus, although the U.S. parent contributed to
Kodak's high share in the U.K. market, the foreign parent's technological
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and economic assets were found to be the major cause of dominant market
power in the United Kingdom.
British United Shoe Machinery (BUSM) was somewhat different from
Champion and Kodak in that it was the largest subsidiary of the three,
responsible for the greater part of group exports, and its R&D effort was
similar in magnitude to its parent. While USM's early advantages in the U.S.
market had contributed to BUSM's position, BUSM's market strength in the
United Kingdom resulted from subsequent independent developments.6 7 The
Commission was more concerned about BUSM's links with the parent's sub-
sidiary DVSG in Germany since patents and know-how were pooled with all
USM's companies. The practice which the Commission found objection-
able-varying cancellation charges according to whether a new contract was
made-did not appear to be a consequence of foreign parent influence.
Rank Xerox and Roche Products differ to a considerable extent from
the three companies discussed earlier, as well as from each other. Rank
Xerox is a special case that began as an equal joint venture between Xerox,
the innovator, and Rank, the partner providing financial, management, and
organizational expertise. Success, therefore, was the result of both parties'
contributions. Subsequently Xerox became the majority shareholder, with
responsibility for long-term planning, pricing policy, patents and licensing,
major sales development, and other issues not immediately relevant to U.K.
market dominance. Rank Xerox retained responsibility for day-to-day manage-
ment, but was subject to strong central control from the parent. The practices
found to be adverse were the result of the two companies' joint efforts, even
though in a formal sense effective control passed to Xerox.68 The problem for
the Commission was that of finding an effective antitrust remedy to the patent
licensing practice rather than the existence of foreign ownership.
Roche Products was also a special case in that it arose from the failure of
the price control mechanism operated by the Department of Health and Social
Security for drug purchases. 69 The investigation was confined to Roche's pric-
ing policies and profit level, but the Commission also examined the patent
behavior of the parent and the transfer prices for active ingredients sold to the
U.K. company as well as other aspects of foreign-parent influence.7' While the
Commission could not express an opinion on these issues because of the form
of the references, 71 it was reasonably clear that Roche Products was subject to
very strong central direction from a foreign parent whose policies did not take
the U.K. public interest into account. Specifically, the transfer prices and
charges for group overheads resulted in excessive prices and profits with no
tax payments, although a precise determination of how excessive was not
possible because of the unwillingness of the parent to supply relevant data.72
Therefore, while the Commission could not comment on the control exercised
by the parent, it had serious doubts about the balance of advantage derived
from the foreign ownership of the U.K. subsidiary.
The purpose in analyzing these cases was to see whether they provided
evidence that foreign ownership contributed toward the market dominance of
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the subsidiary and hence, its ability to follow policies contrary to the U.K.
public interest. Except for Roche Products, the Commission's reports seem to
suggest that where the subsidiary has been long established the initial ad-
vantages accruing from a foreign parent are no longer crucial; instead domi-
nance appears to be related to the U.K. subsidiary's ability to survive over a
long period. This ability derives from skills developed in the U.K. market.
There are, of course, continuing links with parent companies from which the
subsidiaries obtain advantages, but these do not appear to be the most impor-
tant factor. Thus, these cases do not raise a strong presumption that foreign
ownership is itself detrimental. However, the Roche case, along with the
others, shows that the potential for detriment exists because of the nature of
the parent-subsidiary relationship, for example in patent licensing, transfer
pricing, or direction of export activity. This then raises the question whether
existing U.K. antitrust remedies are adequate to deal with actual problems
that exist or may arise in the future.
Before discussing the three references which illustrate the areas where
antitrust enforcement loses its bite, it is useful to state that insofar as struc-
ture and behavior in the United Kingdom are concerned, the government's
remedial powers, with the exception of the control of advertising, are quite
strong. A monopoly may be dissolved, or prices and most other aspects of
conduct can be regulated by order if necessary. Examples of successful re-
medial action are Kodak, where the practices ceased, and Proctor and
Gamble, whose prices for detergents were regulated. 73
The three references that raise enforcement problems are Potash Ltd.,
Roche Products, and Rank Xerox. In the first, the U.K. company was virtu-
ally a sales agency for overseas owners of potash supplies (a commodity that
is not naturally available in the United Kingdom), and there was no direct
way of influencing their policies since the power to regulate price was not
instituted until 1965. The remedial recommendation was that U.K. firms
should seek and develop other sources of supply and U.K. aggregate buying
power should be used to improve bargaining. Aggregation of buying power
did occur and, subsequently, other sources of supply became available. Nev-
ertheless, this case illustrated the difficulty of influencing the policies of
companies operating outside U.K. territorial jurisdiction.
In the Rank Xerox case the Commission found that the company's pat-
ent licensing policy was against the public interest. According to the 1949
Patent Act,' 4 an adverse finding could lead to granting a compulsory patent
license. However, this remedy would not have extended to the U.S. parent of
Xerox. The Commission was content to rely on a 1975 consent order issued
by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission; 75 however, this order contains a
potential flaw in that Xerox is not obliged to provide know-how for uses
outside the United States. It remains to be seen whether this is a serious
barrier to a potential entrant.
The Roche Products case76 raised the problem of obtaining information
and cooperation from companies outside the U.K. jurisdiction. In this in-
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stance, the reluctance of Hoffmann La Roche, the parent, to cooperate did
not prevent the Commission from discovering enough information to reach
valid conclusions about the company's prices and profits. However, if this
information had not been available or of no consequence, the Commission
may not have been able to assess the reasonableness of prices and profits.
77
CONCLUSIONS ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE
MONOPOLIES REFERENCES
At the beginning of this section three questions were posed: (1) whether
foreign ownership increased the market power of U.K. subsidiaries, (2)
whether foreign ownership had operated to the detriment of the U.K. public
interest, and (3) whether existing antitrust remedies were adequate to deal
with this type of market power. Analysis of the references suggests the fol-
lowing conclusions:
1. There is a relatively high incidence of foreign-owned companies in the
concentrated industries which were investigated by the Monopolies
Commission;
2. Direct foreign investment was a method of transferring a product, tech-
nology, or other advantages possessed by the parent to the U.K. subsidi-
ary and initially these were crucial for making successful entry;
3. The activity of the subsidiary after entry, however, (particularly its re-
sponses to existing structure and behavior) were major factors in devel-
oping market power-in the long run these became more important
influences than the links with the parent; and
4. There is no compelling evidence that foreign ownership has resulted in
detriments to the public interest through abuse of market power. How-
ever there are cases where such detriment may occur, and U.K. reme-
dial powers are limited because of jurisdictional limitations.
MERGERS POLICY AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
When merger control was introduced in the United Kingdom in 1965 it was
intended only to apply to a relatively small proportion of corporate acquisi-
tions which had a potential for detriment to the public interest. The reasons
for this have been outlined earlier;78 these continued to determine enforce-
ment of policy until 1973. Mr. Antony Crosland, then president of the Board
of Trade in the Labour administration, expressed what was a widely held
view in a speech on monopolies and mergers policy in June 1969: "I believe
that in Britain, at this moment in time, the trend to mergers has been on
balance beneficial ..... 79 The same attitude was expressed, but in different
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Table 11.
Mergers Subject to Control 1965-78 (excluding newspapers)
Assets Type of Merger Market Share
Acq. £ Percent, Assets Created in Hori-
Period No. Billion Horiz. Vert. Div. zontal Mergers
1965-69 466 16.6 88 5 7 25-50 45
1970-73 438 12.8 65 4 31 51-80 28
1974-78 887 34.2 66 7 27 81-100 15
NA 12
Total 1791 63.6 72 6 22 100
Source: Graham, Trends in U.K. Merger Control, 14 TRADE AND INDUSTRY 525 (1979).
words, by the Conservative secretary of state and president of the Board of
Trade, Mr. John Davies, in the House of Commons in December 1970.
Explaining how he intended to implement policy he said, "I would make a
reference of a merger only if I considered that competition in the relevant
market would be restricted to a damaging degree as a result of that
merger.80
A change came, however, in the early 1970s as the evidence of concen-
tration accumulated and questions began to be raised as to when, or
whether, the economic benefits of the merger wave would appear. Reviewing
policy in November 1973 the minister for trade and consumer affairs, Sir
Geoffrey Howe, said "no Government could be expected to see the process of
concentration continue unquestioned indefinitely at the sort of pace which
we have seen over the last decade ... so I believe the facts already justify a
more active use of our merger powers than has previously been the
,,81
norm ....
Table 11 provides a historical depiction of enforcement policy by giving
data on the mergers subject to the legislation from August 1965 to 1978.
Notable features are the continuing rise in the annual number of mergers
and their size, the absolute (although diminished) importance of horizontal
merger, and the substantial increase in concentration which resulted. Until
1973 inward investment accounted for about 10 percent of all mergers, but
in recent years the proportion has risen to 15 percent.
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The benign attitude towards mergers which shaped policy from 1965 to
1973 is illustrated by the rate of reference to the Monopolies Commission. Up
to the end of 1973, 904 mergers were considered by the Mergers Panel and
25, or 2.8 percent, were referred for investigation. 83 From 1973 to 1978, the
number of references increased to 28, a rate of 3.2 percent. Some character-
istics of those, and the Commission's findings, are set out in table 12. The
body of evidence that has now been accumulated, although limited in some
respects, suggests some tentative conclusions. It appears that an adverse
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Table 12.
References to the Monopolies Commission and Its Conclusions 1965-78.
Number (excluding newspapers)
Public Interest Referral
Type Against Not Against Abandoned Total Rate Percent
Horizontal 12 9 9 30 2.3
Vertical 3 3 - 6 5.1
Diversified 3 6 8 17 4.3
Source: Graham, Trends in U.K. Merger Control, 14 TRADE AND INDUSTRY 525 (1979).
finding is more likely for a horizontal merger than for a vertical or diversified
merger. Indeed, for diversified mergers the likelihood seems to be against an
adverse judgment.84
THE MONOPOLIES COMMISSION'S FINDINGS ON INWARD INVESTMENT
MERGERS
Although there have been only six references of mergers which were sub-
stantial acts of inward investment, the Commission's findings are a valuable
supplement to the evidence derived from the monopoly investigations. All six
were horizontal mergers. Table 13 contains relevant details.
Although the sample is limited, it suggests that substantial detriment to
the U.K. public interest was not identified with such inward investment,
with one exception. A brief description of the Commission's frame of analysis
and how it was applied in the cases of Dentsply Int. Inc./AD International,
and Eurocanadian Ship-holding/Furness Withy and Manchester Liners illus-
trates this more clearly. In order to evaluate the effect of foreign ownership of
U.K. firms, the Commission developed an analytical framework that took into
account the major issues raised by inward investment. Certain elements
were assigned a specific weight or degree of importance depending on the
facts in each case. These are the effects: on competition in the U.K. market,
on supply and service to consumers or customers, on research and develop-
ment, on the management and efficiency of the U.K. company and its em-
ployees, on the location of manufacturing, and on the balance of payments.
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The Commission is required to assess advantages and disadvantages under
each heading and reach a conclusion. It does not regard foreign ownership as
a per se detriment; as it said of Dentsply "we see no reason to think that the
fact that Dentsply is a multinational foreign based company will in itself be
contrary to the public interest."
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In the proposed merger of Dentsply and AD International, the two com-
panies had a trading relationship extending back to 1900 when ADI's prede-
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Table 13.
Inward Investment Mergers Considered by the Monopolies Commission'
Foreign
Name Date of Report bidder Finding
1. Dental Manufacturing/ September 1966 U.S. Not adverse
Dentists Supply of New (did not
York/Amalgamated Dental take place)
2. Dentsply Int. Inc./ June 1975 U.S. Not adverse
AD International
3. H. Weidman/BS August 1975 Switzerland Not adverse
4. Eurocanadian Ship- October 1976 Bermuda Adverse
holding/Furness Withy
and Manchester Liners
5. Fruehauf Corp.; August 1977 U.S. Not adverse
Crane Fruehauf
6. FMC/Merck/ July 1979 U.S. Not adverse
Aliginate Industries
a. There is some duplication as the first and second references involved the same two
companies, Dentsply Int. Inc. (formerly Dentists Supply of New York) and AD Interna-
tional, the U.K. company which changed its name from Amalgamated Dental.
cessors obtained from Dentsply an exclusive franchise for teeth and other
dental products for Europe and other territories. According to renewed agree-
ments, ADI was prohibited from manufacturing teeth. 87
To determine the public interest consequences, the Commission col-
lected evidence under each of the above headings from customers, the dental
profession, government departments, and other sources. The Commission's
concluding remarks indicate how an inward investment merger is assessed:
The only potential detriment to the public interest that we found in the
proposed merger is the possibility that Dentsply might use its substan-
tial market power to adopt unacceptable pricing policies in the United
Kingdom. However, we do not consider any such detriment can be re-
garded as an over-riding argument against the merger bearing in mind
the characteristics of Dentsply and the restraints on such policies, in-
cluding potential competition from abroad. In our view the possibility is
outweighed by the advantages likely to arise under several heads.
These include the following:
a) benefit to ADI's research and development in the United Kingdom;
b) improvement of the management, general efficiency and produc-
tivity of ADI;
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c) gain to the United Kingdom balance of payments through imports
and increased exports.
Moreover, we think there would be some detriment to the public inter-
est if the merger did not take place in that there would be an adverse
effect on ADI's overseas business and on the United Kingdom balance
of payments.
8 8
Substantially the same framework was used for the merger of Eurocana-
dian Shipholding, Furness Withy and Manchester Liners. 9 The latter com-
panies were prominent in liner operations and voyage charters, with Man-
chester Liners carrying a substantial proportion of U.K. and Canadian trade.
Manchester Liners was also the subsidiary of Furness Withy and was the
main user of the port of Manchester and the Manchester Ship Canal. Both
participated in the shipping conferences which regulated freight rates on
their routes.
Eurocanadian was a Bermuda-based company, but was originally of Ca-
nadian registration. It operated in the Europe/Canada trade and was linked in
a complex grouping named Cast which provided shipping and other services
on other routes. It did not participate in shipping conferences.
In these mergers the consequences of foreign ownership were given
more weight because of the international nature of Eurocanadian and its
parent Cast, and the possibility that their commercial interests might not
always coincide with the U.K. public interest. The Commission issued its
judgment on the merger with Manchester Liners (ML), saying:
ML gives a first class service to British exporters and shippers gener-
ally. Transfer of control to ECS would be likely to impair this service. It
might well deprive the British shipper of his present choice between a
conference and nonconference service. ML's operations would become
closely integrated with those of the Cast group and, because of the
widely differing nature and objectives of the two groups as they are at
present, ML would suffer substantial disruption and damage. The
economies that might be obtained by the Cast group from a merged
North Atlantic container operation would compensate neither for this
nor for the shift in the centre of control abroad. The effects of the
merger on the balance of payments and on employment would be more
likely to be unfavorable than favorable. ECS's proposals to use larger
container ships would be likely at least to accelerate any substitution of
Liverpool for Manchester as the base port for ML's North Atlantic op-
erations and we think this would be harmful to regional interests. 90
CONCLUSIONS ON INWARD INVESTMENT MERGERS
To date there have been relatively few references of foreign-initiated mergers
to the Monopolies Commission; one could conclude that most of these did
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not appear to involve the potential for substantial detriment. The Commis-
sion's findings support this conclusion; in only one out of six such mergers
did the Commission conclude that foreign ownership would be adverse to the
U.K. interest. In the other mergers the potential for benefits was considered
favorable, thus lending further support to the generally benign policy stance
toward mergers.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Earlier in this article mention was made of the Green Paper, A Review of
Monopolies and Mergers Policy.9 This report was the result of an internal
committee of officials set up by the previous government to appraise the
competition laws in the light of the growth of corporate concentration and
the United Kingdom's entry into the EEC. The committee made recommen-
dations on mergers, monopolies, and uncompetitive practices. Its main sug-
gestion regarding mergers was that U.K. policy should move away from a
benign attitude toward one of neutrality under which mergers likely to have a
"significant effect" on competition would be subject to much more critical
scrutiny. Nonstatutory guidelines would define significant effect in a manner
similar to the following. Horizontal mergers that resulted in a market share of
at least 25 percent of sales or production in a U.K. market of £4 million or
greater or where the assets to be acquired were £1 million or greater, would
be subject to increased scrutiny. Similar guidelines would apply to vertical
mergers where the acquirer or acquired company had a market share of at
least 25 percent and the acquirer was taking over a significant supplier or
customer. Conglomerate mergers would also be considered to have a signifi-
cant effect on competition where the acquired company had a market share
of at least 25 percent, or the worldwide turnover of the combined enterprise
was £350 million or more of which a significant proportion arose in the
United Kingdom and where the gross assets to be acquired were £16 million
or more.9 2 When applied to recent experience these guidelines suggest that
the effect would be to increase the existing rate of merger references from 3
percent to 12 percent. If implemented, these changes would represent a very
considerable shift in emphasis and would effectively mark the end of the
previous policy that presumed mergers to be beneficial to the U.K. economy.
The main policy proposals on monopoly were that there should be a
continuing program of references to the Commission and that oligopoly be
defined in terms of market share held by the largest four or five firms.
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The committee identified another problem area-uncompetitive prac-
tices by dominant firms. Investigations by the Monopolies Commission had
shown consistent adverse effects from behavior which created or strength-
ened entry barriers, so it was proposed that further consideration be given to
devising effective remedies, particularly where such practices occurred in
small and local markets.
United Kingdom Regulation - 123
This proposal has been taken up by the new government in its Competi-
tion Act, now before the House of Commons, and which is a first stage in a
longer term development of policy.94 Under the Act, the director general of
fair trading, after investigating complaints of uncompetitive practices and
publishing a report, would have power to allow undertakings on the condition
that firms will change their behavior.9 5 If they fail to give satisfactory assur-
ance, he may then refer the practice to the Monopolies Commission for a
judgment whether such practices are against the public interest. 96
The Act also provides for new power to investigate nationalized indus-
tries and certain other publicly owned bodies.97 This would strengthen the
review procedures and enables the Monopolies Commission to examine and
report on their efficiency, costs, and services to consumers, as well as deter-
mine whether a monopoly has been abused. The secretary of state would
have power to make remedial orders. Another provision would give the Office




This article has reviewed U.K. legislation that may be used to control the
development of corporate concentration, and in particular how it has been
applied to transnational corporations investing in the United Kingdom. The
foreign ownership of industry arouses fears in developed and developing
countries alike. There is concern that national sovereignty and indepen-
dence may be undermined, economic growth restricted or distorted, and
consumers, workers, and national entrepreneurs exploited by the alleged
superior market power of the foreign investor. The United Kingdom as a
highly developed economy has been both a major recipient and provider of
foreign investment and thus has a considerable body of accumulated experi-
ence with it. As regards foreign investment in the domestic market the
available evidence does not suggest that the United Kingdom economy has
been significantly exploited. Direct foreign investment has been taking
place throughout the twentieth century and has brought substantial eco-
nomic gains in the form of new products, new technologies, greater per
capita investment (particularly in the less-favored regions), and gains to the
balance of payments. Although direct foreign investment tends to locate
itself in concentrated industries, U.K. firms also share the positions of domi-
nance so that it is likely these industries would also be concentrated in the
absence of foreign investment. To ensure that the undoubted gains from
foreign investment are equitably shared, the United Kingdom has tradition-
ally relied on exchange control (now abandoned), an effective tax system,
and competitive markets as the main regulating mechanism. The evidence
from Monopolies Commission investigations of dominant positions, mergers,
and foreign ownership does not suggest that transnational concentration
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results in substantial and frequent failures in competition. Thus, this part of
the regulatory mechanism appears to operate effectively. Nevertheless,
problems arise, and legislation evolves to deal with those which are capable
of remedy by national action.
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